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Commandments, Crosses, & Prayers: The Roberts 
Court’s Approach to Public Religion 
INTRODUCTION 
Few topics divide the American public more than the 
government’s use of religious expressions and symbols (i.e., public or 
civil religion). However, the American public is not alone in its 
disagreement over how to best resolve this perplexing issue of public 
or civil religion.1 The Supreme Court has also struggled to 
determine a consistent approach to this matter,2 striving to balance 
the requirements of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution3 with the need for a unifying belief system and the 
importance and prevalence of religion in the lives of American 
citizens and the United States as a whole.4 
Most recently, the Roberts Court has attempted to find this 
balance through three cases: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,5 
Salazar v. Buono,6 and Town of Greece. v. Galloway.7 In all three of 
these cases, the Roberts Court has allowed the government to 
include religious expressions in its activities as long as the activity’s 
main purpose is not to promote religion. For reasons discussed 
below, this approach squarely rejects the argument that religious 
expressions should be completely excluded from government 
 
 1. Public religion and civil religion will be used interchangeably in this paper even 
though there might be slight differences in meaning. 
 2. Justice Scalia has previously said that the Court’s approach to Establishment Clause 
cases is “neither a settled, nor a consistent, nor even a rational line of authority that you could 
rely on even if you wanted to.” JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND 
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 69 (2009). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”). 
 4. See infra Part III.B. 
 5. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 6. 559 U.S. 700 (2010). 
 7. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). In choosing these cases, others have been left out because 
they did not address the issue at hand. For example, Hein v. Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (plurality opinion), was left out because it dealt with 
standing and not the merits of public religion. For a look at the Roberts Court’s analysis of 
this case, see Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court and 
the Establishment Clause, 78 MISS. L.J. 199 (2008). 
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activities.8 However, the Court also suggests that the government 
may not preclude any religion from expressing itself when another 
is allowed to do so. This second principle in the Court’s analysis 
ensures that the government does not favor any religion over 
another in governmental expression. Despite vehement objections 
to any form of civil religion, this two-step approach best fosters an 
American community and allows formal recognition of religion’s 
important influence on our government and our society without 
violating the Establishment Clause. It leads to a new type of public 
religion that allows for the governmental expression of all beliefs in 
pursuit of transcending our differences in the pursuit of the 
common good. 
This Comment discusses the Court’s approach in fostering the 
idea of a public religion. Part I gives a background on American civil 
religion, its purpose and form, and then explores some of the 
criticism and proposed alternatives offered by scholars, along with 
the defects of these alternatives. Part II then summarizes and 
analyzes three cases where the Roberts Court has looked at religion 
in the public square, showing how its approach squarely rejects the 
arguments against the government sanctioning religious expressions 
in its affairs. The Court’s analysis also suggests that the government 
cannot force either the exclusion or the inclusion of non-Christians 
in these expressions. Part III argues that these principles effectively 
overcome the problems with civil religion raised by critics and 
addresses the defects found in the proposed alternatives instead of 
adopting any one of those alternatives. Part IV concludes. 
I. AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 
A. Background 
Many have argued that in order for a nation to truly function it 
needs to have an identity and sense of community.9 In other words, 
 
 8. See infra Part II. 
 9. Steven D. Smith, “Sectarianizing” Civil Religion? A Comment on Gedicks and 
Hendrix, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 307, 311 (2007) (“[A] political community . . . is composed of 
people who understand themselves—or imagine themselves—to be in some sense united by 
common ties or commitments.”); see also Silvio Ferrari, Civil Religions: Models and Perspectives, 
41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 749 (2010)); Smith, supra, at 311 n.9 (quoting BENEDICT 
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (rev. ed. 1991) (“‘[A]ll communities larger than 
primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.’ Such a 
community ‘is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know 
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it must give citizens more than simply a legal status or right; it must 
give them an identity as members of a political community.10 This 
“entails sharing a common narrative, partaking in some foundational 
myths, and developing a sense of belonging, solidarity, and 
commitment.”11 This community also requires a common set of 
values.12 To create this community and identity, nations need to have 
“common ties and commitments . . . includ[ing] public, communal 
affirmations of what are widely taken to be important, unifying 
truths.”13 In the past, a state church usually filled this need, “linking 
senses of past, present and future with communal institutions and 
authority.”14 But when there is no such church, a civil religion often 
develops to meet “the need for some sense of transcendent unity,”15 
and provides a “framework within which national identity is 
redefined, thus allowing changes to take place without breaking too 
sharply from the past.”16 
The idea of civil religion traces back to the eighteenth-century 
writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau17 but was reinvigorated more 
 
most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion.’”). 
 10. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 750 n.5 (quoting Christian Joppke, Transformation of 
Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity, in CITIZENSHIP BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 36, 37 
(Engin F. Isin, Peter Nyers & Bryan S. Turner eds., 2008)). 
 11. Id. at 750. To support this idea, Ferrari gives the example of “the U.S. oath of 
allegiance for naturalized citizens,” which has the person renounce all previous 
allegiances, declare their willingness to “support and defend the Constitution” and its 
laws, and make these commitments freely, finishing with “so help me God.” Id. at 750 
n.6 (quoting U.S. CITIZENSHIP & NATURALIZATION SERVS., No. M-476, A GUIDE TO 
NATURALIZATION 28 (2010)). 
 12. Id. at 749 (describing how nations “search for a nucleus of values able to create a 
cohesive group of individuals”). 
 13. Smith, supra note 9, at 311. 
 14. Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 
1248 (1986). 
 15. Id. at 1251; see also Ferrari, supra note 9, at 749 (citing ROBERT BELLAH, THE 
BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL 3 (1975)) (“When a 
particular religion or culture cannot perform this unifying role, civil religion takes its place by 
providing a set of values, symbols, and rituals upon which the spiritual unity and social 
cohesion of a nation can be rebuilt.”). 
 16. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 749. 
 17. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk.4, ch.8, at 130 (Roger D. 
Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin’s Press 1978) (1762) (“There is, therefore, a 
purely civil profession of faith, the articles of which are for the sovereign to establish, not 
exactly as religious dogmas, but as sentiments of sociability without which it is impossible to be 
a good citizen or a faithful subject.”). 
SMITH.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  2:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
848 
recently by Robert Bellah.18 Bellah defined America’s version as a 
“public religious dimension . . . expressed in a set of beliefs, 
symbols, and rituals,”19 such as prophets, martyrs, “sacred events 
and sacred places,” and “solemn rituals and symbols.”20 He 
emphasized that it “is not the worship of the American nation but 
an understanding of the American experience in the light of 
ultimate and universal reality”21— in other words, a “vehicle of 
national religious self-understanding.”22 It is “based on the idea 
that religion can play a helpful public role by fostering republican 
virtues.”23 However, it should be “neither sectarian nor in any 
specific sense Christian,” nor is it “religion in general.”24 Thus, 
“[a]ll other religious opinions are outside the cognizance of the 
state and may be freely held by citizens.”25 
In the United States, many of the colonies originally had some 
form of a state church that created their colony’s identity and sense 
of community.26 Near the early nineteenth century, a civil religion 
characterized as “‘Nonsectarian’ Christianity” began to develop and 
eventually replaced all state churches.27 The United States 
distinguished itself from most European nations by formally 
separating church and state.28 However, this “[s]eparation . . . does 
not affect the interaction of religion, politics, and society.”29 Over 
 
 18. See, e.g., Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967). 
 19. Id. at 4. 
 20. Id. at 18. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 8. 
 23. Ferrari, supra note 9 at 756 (citing Robert N. Bellah, The Revolution and the 
Civil Religion, in RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55, 60 (Jerald C. Brauer et 
al. eds., 1976). 
 24. Bellah, supra note 18, at 8. 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity 
and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 279 (2007) (citing Michael W. 
McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of 
Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2110–11 (2003)); see also Bellah, supra note 18, at 8 
(explaining the status of state churches in each of the colonies). 
 27. Id. at 280–81 (citing Bellah, supra note 18, at 4.) (describing a “‘civil religion,’ 
which linked American citizenship and loyalty to a ‘nonsectarian’ Christian understanding that 
the United States has a divine origin and destiny”); see also Ferrari supra note 9, at 756 
(labeling it a “non-denominational civil religion”). 
 28. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 756. 
 29. Id. at 756 (citing Bellah, supra note 18, at 3). Ferrari gives two examples of such 
separation. First, “[w]hile it prevents the teaching of religion in public schools, it does not 
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time, this civil religion expanded into a Judeo-Christian version that 
included Catholics and Jews.30 The United States has kept this 
Judeo-Christian civil religion, with little alteration, since the 1950s.31 
However, mass immigration from Asia has increased the number of 
non-monotheistic religious people, in addition to the increase in the 
number of Americans who are atheist or agnostic or who do not 
belong to any particular church.32 Thus, American civil religion has 
existed in one form or another since the founding of the nation, 
and—like all traditions—it has been the subject of much criticism, 
especially over what form it should take33 and if it should be followed 
at all.34 
B. Problems and Alternatives 
Critics have specified many problems with the current American 
civil religion. First, in attempting to keep civil religion, the U.S. 
Supreme Court uses unprincipled, inconsistent approaches that do 
not adhere to traditional Establishment Clause tests.35 Second, public 
religion undermines our “commitment to pluralism” by having the 
government favor certain religions’ symbols and terminology over 
others,36 specifically by ignoring and alienating those who do not 
believe in monotheism.37 Third, by allowing this civil religion, the 
government is placing religion at the head of public discussions.38 
Fourth, civil religion contaminates sectarian religion and puts 
pressure on the government to interpret religious symbols as lacking 
 
prohibit the teaching about religions.” Id. Second, “it does not ban wearing religious symbols 
in public institutions.” Id. 
 30. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 281–84. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 285. 
 33. See, e.g., Mirsky, supra note 14. 
 34. See, e.g., Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 284. 
 35. Mirsky, supra note 14, at 1243–46. 
 36. Id. at 1240, 1246. 
 37. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 276, 301–02, 305; see also Ferrari supra note 
9, at 757 (arguing that American civil religion’s “challenge is building a coherent and 
functioning civil religion from different religious (and non-religious) sources. . . . [making it] 
difficult to foresee how non-believers and followers of non-monotheistic religions can be 
incorporated in the arena of full citizenship if it is crowded with symbols that are not theirs”). 
 38. Mirsky, supra note 14 at 1240 (“[Public religion] could clearly operate as a 
vehicle for the establishment of a religious hegemony over the symbols and rhetoric of 
public discourse.”). 
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religious significance.39 Fifth, and finally, conservative Christians are 
increasingly advocating that the reach of public religion only include 
their beliefs and ideas.40 
With all of these problems, some have argued that Americans 
should modify or abolish civil religion entirely.41 Indeed, the 
following four alternatives have been either suggested or attempted, 
ranging from significant involvement of religion in public affairs to 
no involvement. The first alternative is to have a state church, such as 
Catholicism.42 In Italy, Catholic values “govern the ethical, cultural, 
and religious plurality of the country.”43 As an example, public 
schools must hang a crucifix in every classroom,44 because it is both a 
“symbol of Italian identity,” ”manifest[ing] the historical and 
cultural tradition of Italy and . . . a sign of a value system based on 
freedom, equality, human dignity, and religious tolerance.”45 
The second alternative comes from legal scholar Yehudah 
Mirsky. He proposed adopting a civil religion farther removed from 
specific religions.46 This civil religion would be based on five core 
beliefs: 1) “[the] transcendent principle of morality to which [the] 
polity is, or ought to be, responsible”; 2) “democracy as a way of 
life for all people and a concomitant belief in an American mission 
 
 39. Id. (“[Public religion] poses a significant threat to the purity of ecclesiastical 
institutions and to the transcendence of religious beliefs by its vague hallowing of public and 
political life.”); see id. at 1247 (“[P]ublic religion’s legitimacy [is based] on its irrelevance.”); 
see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 711–12 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes 
omitted) (“To suggest, as the Court does, that [the crèche] symbol is merely ‘traditional’ and 
therefore no different from Santa’s house or reindeer is not only offensive to those for whom 
the crèche has profound significance, but insulting to those who insist for religious or personal 
reasons that the story of Christ is in no sense a part of ‘history’ nor an unavoidable element of 
our national ‘heritage.’”); Bellah, supra note 18, at 15; Ferrari supra note 9, at 757 (citing R. 
Jonathan Moore, Civil Religion, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 63 
(Catharine Cockson ed., 2003)) (asserting that an enlargement of American civil religion’s 
border “is bound to dilute its content”). 
 40. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–97, 300–01. 
 41. See id. at 285; Mirsky, supra note 14. 
 42. See Ferrari supra note 9, at 753–56. As previously mentioned, there have been some 
efforts by conservative Christians in the U.S. to establish something similar to the Italian 
version. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–97, 300–01. 
 43. Ferrari supra note 9, at 753 (citing Camillo Ruini, President, It. Episcopal Conf., 
Quale spazio per il cristianesimo nella nuova Europa [Is There Room for Christianity in the New 
Europe] (Feb. 11, 2005), http:// chiesa.espresso.repubblica.it/articolo/23170). 
 44. Id. at 754 (citing Regio Decreto 30 aprile 1924, n. 965, art. 118, in G.U. 25 
giugno 1924, n. 148 available at http://www.edscuola.eu/wordpress/?p=17510). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Mirsky, supra note 14, at 1249, 1252, 1256. 
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to spread it the world over”; 3) “civil piety, that exercising the 
responsibilities of citizenship is somehow a good end in itself”; 4) 
“American religious folkways”; and 5) “Destiny ha[ving] great 
things in store for the American people.”47 To arrive at this form of 
civil religion, he suggests changing current traditions and 
terminology to remove any sign of sectarian elements.48 For 
example, he would replace legislative prayer with “the very 
evocative ritual of a moment of silence,” and the National Day of 
Prayer with a “National Day of Reflection.”49 The key is that this 
civil religion focuses on the political, not the sacral.50 
For the third alternative, Professors Frederick Mark Gedicks 
and Roger Hendrix challenge the need for civil religion today.51 
They argue that the U.S. should abandon civil religion entirely and 
instead develop “thin, procedural values, which permit individuals 
to pursue their own conceptions of the good so long as they do not 
interfere with that pursuit by others.”52 In other words, they want 
civil religion to be replaced by “purely secular beliefs”53 or “thin, 
procedural values” as the basis for our government and 
community.54 They argue that this would both remove any 
alienation felt by non-monotheists and avoid a national identity 
controlled by the majority religions. 
Finally, in a version similar to Gedicks and Hendrix’s approach, 
the fourth alternative of civil religion seeks to follow the French’s 
approach of laïcité.55 “Laïcité is seen as a cluster of universal and 
abstract values—such as liberty, equality, and tolerance—that every 
 
 47. Id. at 1252. 
 48. Id. at 1256. 
 49. Id. He also suggests replacing “In God We Trust” with “a less sacral alternative” 
and “distinguishing the Nativity of Christ from the pledge of allegiance and other practices of 
civil religion that we are willing to accept by pointing to the essentially political character of 
the pledge, couched in religious terminology though it may be.” Id. 
 50. Id. at 1249. 
 51. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26. 
 52. Id. at 305; see also Ferrari, supra note 9, at 763 n.66 (quoting Jan-Werner Müller & 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Patriotism: An Introduction, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 67, 67 
(2008)) (“The concept of constitutional patriotism designates the idea that political 
attachment ought to center on the norms, the values, and, more indirectly, the procedures of a 
liberal democratic constitution.”). 
 53. Smith, supra note 9, at 312–13. 
 54. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 305. 
 55. See Ferrari, supra note 9, at 751–53. 
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citizen and group must embrace . . . .”56 It seeks to “include[] and 
reconcile[] the particular values of the religious, racial, ethnic, 
cultural, and political communities living in France.”57 This differs 
from Gedicks and Hendrix’s approach in its public treatment of 
religion. Its goal is to “shield[] [citizens] from the competing values 
upheld by religions.”58 It assumes that “not only the state and its 
institutions, but also society and politics, have to be independent 
from particular traditions and conceptions of life. . . . [As a result,] 
these traditions are to be pushed to the margins of public life.”59 For 
example, French public schools are banned from teaching about any 
religion and students cannot “wear[] religious symbols that are too 
conspicuous in school.”60 
While each alternative has its own benefits, they each also face 
important difficulties. In the first alternative, having a state church 
forces other religions and beliefs to “accept [the state religion’s] 
dominant position as the civil religion of the country,” something 
that is becoming more difficult because of the growing plurality of 
religions in most countries.61 Despite the existence of many 
religions and beliefs in the country, the government requires all 
citizens to constantly conform their public behavior to only one 
religion’s values.62 
The second alternative (Mirsky’s approach) would entirely strip 
the religion out of civil religion. While it would still be a set of 
beliefs and traditions, it would be devoid of any religious meaning 
or symbols. This may seem an attractive option, but research 
suggests that religion produces social goods better than secular 
 
 56. Id. at 751. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 753. 
 59. Id. (citing Jean Bauberot, Roberto Blancarte & Micheline Milot, Déclaration sur la 
laïcité [Declaration of laïcité], in JEAN BAUBEROT, L’INTÉGRISME RÉPUBLICAIN CONTRE LA 
LAÏCITÉ [The Republican Fundamentalism Against Secularism] 247–65 (2006)). 
 60. Id. at 752 (citing Loi 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du 
principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans 
les écoles, collèges et lycées publics [Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 Framing, Pursuant to 
the Principle of Laïcité, the Wearing of Signs or Dress Denoting Religious Affiliation in Public 
schools], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Mar. 15, 2004, p. 5190). 
 61. See id. at 755–56 (detailing how “non-Christian” immigrants struggle to accept 
Catholicism’s established position as Italy’s civil religion). 
 62. See id. 
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reasoning.63 Some research suggests that “religious beliefs . . . are 
more supportive of social justice and human rights than secular 
discourse. . . .”64 Similarly, some scholars have found that “religious 
beliefs . . . command the assent of more citizens in this country 
than . . . secular ‘public reason.’”65 This is because “the coldness 
and individualism of these procedural values make them unable to 
create the solidarity, commitment, and feeling of belonging 
required by a full citizenship.”66 The states that have followed this 
are arguably “no longer nations in the sense that they have lost the 
ability to create the emotional commitment that once characterized 
the national state.”67 
Both Gedicks and Hendrix’s solution and the French’s laïcité 
confront the same issues as Mirsky’s. They also face additional 
problems. First, “secular discourse is [generally not] ‘neutral’ toward 
religion and inclusive of all citizens.”68 If secular beliefs replace civil 
religion, then religions in general may find themselves being treated 
 
 63. See Smith, supra note 9, at 313; see also ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 123, 130 (2013) (arguing that religion should be 
promoted in America as a good because of the several benefits that religion produces). 
 64. Smith, supra note 9, at 313 n.16 (citing Michael J. Perry, Comment on The Limits of 
Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067 (1985); see also JOHN COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC 
THEOLOGY 193–98 (1982) (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he strongest American voices for a 
compassionate just community always appealed in public to religious imagery and sentiments. 
The American religious ethic and rhetoric contain rich, polyvalent symbolic power to 
command commitments of emotional depth, when compared to ‘secular’ language[,] Secular 
Enlightenment language remains exceedingly ‘thin’ as a symbol system.”). Smith also cites 
another Perry article that argues “that a religious rationale is necessary to justify human 
rights.” Smith, supra note 9, at 313 n.16 (citing MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 11–41 (1998)). 
 65. Smith, supra note 9, at 313. (citing BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
DEMOCRACY (2007)). 
 66. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 759. Ferrari similarly asserts “that, in the long run, a 
citizenship based only on the cold exchange of rights and obligations is not viable; something 
more, capable of warming the hearts of citizens, is required.” Id. at 750 (citing Tariq Modood, 
Multiculturalism, Citizenship and National Identity, in CITIZENSHIP BETWEEN PAST AND 
FUTURE 117 (Engin F. Isin, Peter Nyers & Bryan S. Turner eds., 2008)). He also agrees with 
a German lawyer’s belief that “constitutional texts cannot create values, thus it is unfair to 
expect that they can give citizens a feeling of belonging and solidarity.” Id. at 763 (citing Ernst 
Wolfgang Böckenförde, Wahrheit und Freiheit: Zur Weltverantwortung der Kirche heute [Truth 
and Freedom: To the World Responsibility of the Church Today], ZUR DEBATTE [THE 
DEBATE], July 2004, at 5–6.). 
 67. Id. at 760. 
 68. Smith, supra note 9, at 313 (citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and 
Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992)). 
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as less valuable in the public than those ideologies and arguments 
devoid of religion.69 This unfairly discriminates against religion. 
Additionally, these solutions do not answer an important question: 
Will arguments and potential societal goods be rejected because of 
their source (i.e. religion)? There is a growing rejection of all 
arguments made by religious people whether they are based on 
secular reasoning or not.70 Removing religion entirely from 
governmental expression would only fuel this notion that religion 
cannot be used in the pursuit of societal or secular good. 
Civil religion is based on the idea that even though we cannot 
agree on all things, we can still agree on certain core principles and 
those often involve some element of religion in one form of 
another.71 In fact, “no playing field is absolutely neutral and, for this 
reason, the best way to deal with this dilemma is to reduce the 
playing field’s rules to the minimum required for a fair game.”72 
Thus, with no improved solution found outside of the current civil 
religion, this comment now look to the Roberts Court to see if its 
approach can resolve these problems, by first summarizing the 
relevant cases and then analyzing the Court’s pitfalls before offering 
a new solution. 
II. ROBERTS COURT CASE ANALYSIS 
A. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 
The Roberts Court first addressed public religion in Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum.73 In 2009, the Summum religion sued 
Pleasant Grove City for violating the Free Speech Clause by 
accepting a Ten Commandments Monument in its public park but 
not accepting its proposed religious monument.74 The city argued 
that it “limit[ed] monuments in the Park to those that ‘either (1) 
directly relate to the history of [the city], or (2) were donated by 
 
 69. See Luke Goodrich, Mexico’s Separation of Church and State, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2010, 
1:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703740704575095704065365166. 
 70. See Brett Scharffs, Can Public Reason Accommodate Conscience?, INT’L CTR. FOR L. 
& RELIGION STUD., http://www.iclrs.org/index.php?pageId=1&linkId=205&cont 
entId=2010&blurbId=17119 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 71. See Smith, supra note 9, at 312. 
 72. Ferrari, supra note 9, at 761. 
 73. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 74. Id. at 464–66. 
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groups with longstanding ties to the [city’s] community.’”75 The 
Summum monument qualified under neither.76 
The Supreme Court held that the city’s rejection of one 
monument, while accepting others is “a form of government speech” 
which is “not subject to the Free Speech Clause.”77 The Supreme 
Court distinguished between private and government speech, 
finding that the former requirement is bound by the Free Speech 
Clause, but the latter is not.78 Under government speech, the 
government can “select the views that it wants to express” in a 
forum that it creates, since it cannot express every single viewpoint.79 
If the government creates a forum, it can then limit the types of 
groups or subjects discussed there and make restrictions “that are 
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”80 
Additionally, the Court held that a city cannot violate the 
Establishment Clause when putting permanent monuments on its 
property.81 But a city creates its identity through these monuments. 
Thus it is allowed to use “factors [such] as esthetics, history, and 
local culture” in choosing which monuments it will accept.82 A city 
does not need to proclaim what message it intends to send by its 
monuments.83 Nor is a monument limited in its interpretation by 
what the donors intended the message to be.84 
Despite this language, the Court does not fully explain how the 
Ten Commandments monument meets these criteria because these 
facts and arguments were not fully before it. The Court seems to 
 
 75. Id. at 465. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 481. 
 78. Id. at 467. For a further discussion on the uncertain line between the Free Speech 
and Establishment Clauses in this case see generally RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison: 
Private Speech, Government Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 2045 (2010). 
 79. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468; see also id. (quoting Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 
12–13 (1990)) (holding that government would likely not function “‘[i]f every citizen 
were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which 
he disagreed’”). 
 80. Id. at 470. For more on the Court’s treatment of public forums see generally 
Timothy Zick, Summum, the Vocality of Public Places, and the Public Forum, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 2203 (2010). 
 81. Summum, 555 U.S. at 468. 
 82. Id. at 472. 
 83. Id. at 473. 
 84. Id. at 473–74. 
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suggest that the Ten Commandments monument helps create the 
city’s identity. But the Court does not specify how the monument 
qualifies as esthetics, history, or local culture. The city did limit its 
monuments to those that “either (1) directly relate to the history of 
[the city], or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to 
the [city’s] community.”85 There is no explanation on how a Ten 
Commandments monument relates to Pleasant Grove’s history. So it 
must be assumed that the monument was accepted because the 
Fraternal Order of Eagles had longstanding ties to the community86 
and that this is what the Court most likely qualified as local culture. 
While allowing any religion or religiously related group to 
donate simply because they have been in the community for a long 
time could lead to promoting a particular religion, it will not so long 
as the monument’s purpose is not to establish that particular religion 
but to celebrate its impact on the community. The resulting principle 
is that the city can use a religious expression in a public monument 
as long as it is celebrating the cultural impact of that religion or 
religiously oriented group on the community. However, the 
monument must not violate the Establishment Clause. So far as the 
Court knew, the monument was valid. 
One question with this approach is whether the city would have 
allowed monuments from smaller religious groups that did have 
longstanding ties to the community or were important culturally. 
The Summum faith did not have any major ties to the community, 
but suppose there was a significant minority of the population that 
was Muslim, Buddhist, or Sikh, would their monuments be 
accepted? The Court does not address this issue because it was not 
before it. If the city did not accept a minority religion’s monument, 
then the test would really be about whether the monument came 
from a large, “mainstream” religion (i.e. Christianity). But those 
were not the facts before the Court. However, the city would most 
likely have allowed a monument from Mormons because they are a 
majority faith in Utah and they have longstanding ties to the 
community, including settling most of the towns. A monument 
depicting Mormon pioneers could certainly pass this test despite its 
religious influence. If no minority religious monuments are allowed, 
then it would appear that part of the monument’s purpose is to 
 
 85. Id. at 465. 
 86. Id. 
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promote a particular religion, Christianity, instead of just celebrating 
its cultural impact on the community. However, since the Court did 
not have a chance to address this issue, it is uncertain how the Court 
would have held. So, we turn to Salazar to see what guidance it 
provides on the role of religion in government activities. 
B. Salazar v. Buono 
A year later in Salazar v. Buono,87 the Court addressed another 
religious monument in the public square. Buono had obtained an 
injunction forbidding the government “from permitting the display 
of [a] Latin cross” on public land.88 Both lower courts found that 
the cross violated the Establishment Clause because it “conveyed an 
impression of governmental endorsement of religion.”89 The 
government did not appeal this injunction to the Supreme Court, so 
the judgment became final.90 Congress responded by passing a law 
requiring the land to be transferred to the private organization that 
first erected the cross in exchange for a portion of the organization’s 
land.91 That organization could keep the land so long as the property 
was maintained “as a memorial commemorating United States 
participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of 
that war.”92 Buono contended this was an attempt to avoid fulfilling 
the injunction he was granted and obtained another injunction 
preventing the land transfer.93 In issuing this second injunction, the 
district court did not consider whether the government’s attempt to 
maintain the cross still violated the Establishment Clause, but it did 
consider the land-transfer act and found that it violated the purpose 
of the injunction.94 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the 
government challenged Buono’s standing, but the Court found that 
 
 87. 559 U.S. 700 (2010). It should be noted that Buono is a plurality opinion with 
three justices agreeing on the language that follows in this section. Id. at 704. Justice Alito 
agreed with the entire opinion, except he disagreed with the plurality that it should be 
remanded, finding that the facts sufficiently supported a resolution of the case. Id. at 723 
(Alito, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and Thomas believed that the court should not address 
the merits because the plaintiff had no standing. Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 88. Id. at 708 (plurality opinion). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 709. 
 91. Id. at 709–10. 
 92. Id. at 710. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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Buono had standing in this case because he obtained a “‘judicially 
cognizable’ interest in ensuring compliance with [the injunction].”95 
The Court then turned to the merits of the injunction holding 
that all courts must address any “significant changes in the law or 
circumstances underlying an injunction.”96 Because the district court 
based its first injunction on perception but based its final injunction 
on “suspicion of an illicit governmental purpose” (i.e. establishing a 
religion), it failed to decide if “the original finding of wrongdoing 
continue[d] to justify the court’s intervention.”97 The Court found 
that the injunction’s general purpose of “avoiding the perception of 
governmental endorsement” would not oppose the government’s 
decision to transfer the land to a private party.98 Because of the 
“highly fact-specific” inquiry needed to evaluate Congress’s land-
transfer act, the Court remanded the case to the district court.99 
The Court also found that the cross was originally erected to 
commemorate World War I veterans, not to endorse Christianity.100 
It also found that seventy years of existence had intertwined “the 
cross and the cause it commemorated . . . in the public 
consciousness.”101 Accordingly, Congress was recognizing its 
historical, not its religious meaning.102 When Congress had to decide 
how to comply with the injunction, it chose to accommodate a 
symbol that “has complex meaning beyond the expression of 
religious views.”103 The Court found that “avoiding governmental 
endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in 
the public realm,” and “[t]he Constitution does not oblige 
government to avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in 
society.”104 
The Court then questioned the validity of the district court’s 
reasonable person test, but assumed that even under that test, the 
cross would withstand a challenge.105 The district court focused 
 
 95. Id. at 712. 
 96. Id. at 714. 
 97. Id. at 718–19. 
 98. Id. at 720. 
 99. Id. at 722. 
 100. Id. at 715. 
 101. Id. at 716. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 717. 
 104. Id. at 718–19. 
 105. Id. at 720–21. 
SMITH.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  2:55 PM 
845 Commandments, Crosses, & Prayers 
 859 
solely on the cross’s religious meaning, instead of “its background 
and context.”106 A Latin cross does more than represent Christianity, 
it is also “used to honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble 
contributions, and patient striving help secure an honored place in 
history for this Nation and its people. . . . It evokes thousands of 
small crosses in foreign fields marking the graves of Americans who 
fell in battles . . . .”107 
The Court clearly followed the same test by finding that the 
purpose of the cross was not to promote Christianity, but to 
remember the fallen soldiers. It also reiterated one of the main 
reasons for allowing public religion, namely that religion has a major 
role in society and should not be completely ignored by the 
government in order to avoid an appearance of establishment. 
It could be argued that the cross only reminds us of all the 
fallen Christian soldiers (who happen to be the vast majority 
during World War I) and thus is still promoting Christianity over 
other religions. But, while the cross does not represent the 
religious views of all the fallen soldiers, it does represent the 
graveside marker for an overwhelming majority of them. We are 
remembering these soldiers in their death and sacrifice for us, 
which is symbolized by the one indicator of where they lie, the 
cross. So while there may be other ways to memorialize fallen 
troops, the government does not need to reject a cross simply 
because it is also associated with a particular religion. 
Additionally, the Stevens dissent points out that the Park Service 
did not allow a Buddhist to set up a smaller monument 
commemorating the death of Buddhist soldiers.108 So, once again the 
test seems to apply only if the religion is a majority faith (i.e. 
Christianity). However, the rejection of the Buddhist monument was 
not the issue before the court and so they could not rule on it. The 
issue was whether transferring the land with the cross to a private 
entity still violated the injunction. The Court found that it did not 
and its dicta about the cross strongly suggests that the cross would 
be appropriate to retain as long as it continued to fulfill a secular 
purpose. But it was not until Town of Greece v. Galloway that the 
Court was directly confronted with the issue of public religion. 
 
 106. Id. at 721. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
SMITH.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  2:55 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
860 
C. Town of Greece v. Galloway 
Five years after Buono, the Court considered the clearest case of 
involvement of religion in governmental action in Town of Greece v. 
Galloway.109 The town of Greece, New York began their monthly 
board meetings with a prayer given by a local minister who was 
almost always Christian because “nearly all of the congregations in 
town were Christian.”110 After two citizens complained about the 
prayers being all Christian, the town made an extra effort to invite 
non-Christian religious leaders.111 These two citizens then sued the 
town, alleging that this practice violated the Establishment Clause 
“by preferring Christians over other prayer givers and by 
sponsoring sectarian prayers.”112 They sought an injunction limiting 
the prayers to “‘inclusive and ecumenical’ [ones] that referred only 
to a ‘generic God’ and would not associate the government with 
any one faith or belief.”113 
Following precedent in Marsh v. Chambers,114 the Court found 
that legislative prayer does not violate the Establishment Clause.115 
The analysis is not based on any other Establishment Clause test, but 
“by reference to historical practices and understandings.”116 So, it is 
not an exception to the Establishment Clause because legislative 
prayer was an accepted practice by the Founders at the time they 
adopted the First Amendment.117 
The Court118 also held that the purpose of legislative prayer is to 
“lend[] gravity to public business, remind[] lawmakers to transcend 
petty differences in pursuit of a higher purpose, and express[] a 
common aspiration to a just and peaceful society.”119 Lawmakers, not 
 
 109. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 110. Id. at 1816. 
 111. Id. at 1817 (explaining how the “town invited a Jewish layman and the chairman of 
the local Baha’i temple to deliver prayers” and accepted the request of a Wiccan priestess). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 115. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1819. 
 116. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 
573, 670 (1989)). 
 117. Id. at 1818–19. 
 118. It should be noted that Justices Thomas and Scalia did not join this part of the 
opinion. Id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. at 1818 (plurality opinion). 
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the public, are the principal audience for these prayers.120 A prayer for 
them may “set[] the mind to a higher purpose and thereby ease[] 
the task of governing . . . , reflect the values they hold as private 
citizens . . . , [and] show who and what they are without denying the 
right to dissent by those who disagree.”121 As Marsh explains, 
legislative prayer is a “symbolic expression [of] a ‘tolerable 
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held,’” and has “become part of 
the fabric of our society.”122 These prayers “acknowledg[e] the 
central place that religion, and religious institutions, hold in the lives 
of those present.”123 They recognize that “many Americans deem 
that their own existence must be understood by precepts far beyond 
the authority of government to alter or define . . . .”124 They also 
have a “ceremonial purpose.”125 Legislative prayer is “part of our 
heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom, similar to the 
Pledge of Allegiance, inaugural prayer, or the recitation of ‘God save 
the United States and this honorable Court’ at the opening of this 
Court’s sessions.”126 Doing away with this traditional practice would 
“begin anew the very divisions along religious lines that the 
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent.”127 
The Court then found that precedent does not require 
“nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer[s].”128 Marsh explicitly held that 
the “‘content of the prayer is not of concern to judges,’ provided 
‘there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited 
to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.’”129 Nonsectarian prayers would require the government to 
 
 120. Id. at 1825. 
 121. Id. at 1825–26; see also Orrin G. Hatch, Keynote Address, 2015 BYU L. REV. 585, 
591–92 (“The argument against basing laws on religious considerations rests on the view that 
religion is a purely private matter and, therefore, public debate and political decision-making 
may legitimately be based only on so-called public reason, which is defined as excluding 
religious values and expression. This view . . . . insists that religion is limited to belief, not 
behavior; that religious exercise is individual, not collective; and, especially, that religion is 
something that should be conducted in private, not in public.”). 
 122. Id. at 1818–19 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)). 
 123. Id. at 1827. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1828. 
 126. Id. at 1825. 
 127. Id. at 1819. 
 128. Id. at 1820. 
 129. Id. at 1821–22 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–795 (1983)). 
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unconstitutionally supervise and censor religious speech.130 
“Government may not mandate a civic religion that stifles any but 
the most generic reference to the sacred . . . .”131 Even if these 
prayers were required, it is likely impossible to determine what 
would “qualif[y] as generic or nonsectarian” and ministers should 
not be asked to “set aside their nuanced and deeply personal beliefs 
for vague and artificial ones.”132 Prayers may make “passing reference 
to religious doctrines,” because “[o]ur tradition assumes that adult 
citizens, firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate 
a ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith.”133 
Only “a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, 
or betray an impermissible government purpose,” will violate the 
Establishment Clause.134 The legislature must follow a 
nondiscrimination policy, but it does not need to search “for non-
Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”135 
This would require excessive “government entanglement with 
religion” by requiring “‘wholly inappropriate judgments about the 
number of religions [it] should sponsor and the relative frequency 
with which it should sponsor each.’”136 However, legislators cannot 
“direct[] the public to participate in the prayers, single[] out 
dissidents for opprobrium, or indicate[] that their decisions might be 
influenced by a person’s acquiescence in the prayer opportunity.”137 
Because none of these issues were occurring, the Court found that 
the prayers did not violate the Establishment Clause.138 
Thus, the Court’s approach in Town of Greece explicitly endorses 
religious expression during governmental activities. While the Court 
focused on secular purposes for legislative prayer, it also included in 
its purposes the religious expression of individuals.139 It also explains 
these prayers in civil religion terms by pointing out the prayer’s 
 
 130. Id. at 1822. 
 131. Id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (“The suggestion that 
government may establish an official or civic religion as a means of avoiding the establishment 
of a religion with more specific creeds strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.”)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1823. 
 134. Id. at 1824. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 617 (Souter, J., concurring)). 
 137. Id. at 1826. 
 138. Id. at 1828. 
 139. Town of Greece. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826–27 (2014). 
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ceremonial purpose, similar to other traditions in our civil religion.140 
However, the Court also flatly rejected a nonsectarian approach, 
favoring one where any religion can participate and the government 
did not have to give preference to any particular sect.141 
It could be argued that this case is just the third example of the 
Court allowing the government to use only Christian religious 
expressions, but this ignores the facts of the case. The town had 
almost no non-Christian congregations and never denied the prayer 
to a non-Christian religious leader. The Court would need to 
assume facts not in evidence to say that this situation was the 
government promoting Christianity. Instead, the government was 
allowing local religious individuals to express themselves in a 
government setting in a way that benefited the community’s 
governmental activities. Forcing the town to obtain outside 
individuals changes the focus to the individual giving the prayer 
instead of the prayer’s purpose. If the town had denied non-
Christians the opportunity to pray or if the Christian ministers had 
attacked other non-Christian faiths in the prayer, then the town 
would be establishing Christianity. But these were not the facts of 
the case and so should not govern its final outcome.142 
In light of the outcomes of these cases, this Comment will now 
discuss how the reasoning of these cases (both in dicta and the 
holdings) shows the Robert Courts acceptance of public religion. 
III. THE ROBERT’S COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF PUBLIC RELIGION 
A. The Court’s Guiding Public Religion Principles 
Throughout all three cases, the Roberts Court follows two 
consistent principles in its reasoning. First, the government can use 
religious elements for non-religious purposes. Second, the 
government cannot exclude non-majority religions that want to 
 
 140. Id. at 1825, 1828. 
 141. Id. at 1820–24. 
 142. But see id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that since the non-Christian 
prayers were only allowed after the initial complaints from citizens, the practice was promoting 
Christianity over other religions until they were threatened with a lawsuit). However, at no 
point was the town intentionally discriminating against non-Christians. To force them by 
threat of lawsuit to reach out to other religions makes the town intentionally discriminate in 
favor of particular religions. And while the town could have potentially done a better job at 
letting these other faiths know about this opportunity, see id. at 1839–40, it did not have to, 
see id. at 1824 (majority opinion). 
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participate, but it also does not need to make an extra effort to 
ensure that multiple religions are represented. This two-pronged 
approach will allow greater religious expression within the country’s 
civil religion framework and thus offers a possible solution to the 
problems critics have pointed out about the current circumstances. 
Under the Court’s approach, religious expressions can be used as 
long as they promote a secular purpose.143 This can include honoring 
fallen veterans144 or helping legislators transcend their differences 
before they begin the process of lawmaking.145 However, it can also 
include secular purposes as tied to religion. It allows individuals to 
express their religion publicly,146 and it recognizes the importance of 
religion in American culture and history,147 as well as in the 
individual lives of many Americans.148 
This approach will also lead to the cultivation of a new public 
religion to replace the current Judeo-Christian version. This public 
religion would allow all forms of religious belief to be expressed in 
the public square as long as they don’t promote one religious sect 
over another but instead help establish an American community. This 
would be a civil religion that seeks to transcend the differences 
between religious sects, and even those who are non-religious, in 
order to focus on goals that all desire. It would fulfill Justice 
Kennedy’s description of prayers at city council meetings in a way 
that the current Judeo-Christian version cannot. 
As will be argued in the next section, the key is finding a 
common denominator that can unite Americans without diluting 
its influence on each individual. Judeo-Christianity cannot 
inspire or unite us as Americans as a civil religion is supposed to 
 
 143. A recent article criticizes this approach arguing that religious people seeking to keep 
public religious symbols by giving them secular meanings are leading their society to the very 
end that they hoped to avoid, further secularization. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale 
Annichino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An Approach to the Constitutional Meaning of Confessional 
Symbols, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 101, 167–68 (forthcoming 2015). 
 144. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 709–10 (2010). 
 145. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1825. 
 146. See id. at 1826–27. 
 147. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009); see also Jean-Paul 
Willaime, Towards a Recognition and Dialogue Secularism in Europe, 2015 BYU L. REV. 779, 
798–99 (“Merely considering the individual aspects of religious and philosophical attitudes 
fails to account for the cultural strata of societies, the fact that particular religious dimensions 
have played a more significant role in the history of the societies and in their configuration as 
state-national communities.”). 
 148. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827. 
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do if it excludes a growing minority of American religious 
people149 or references only the most abstract religious principles 
that do not motivate anyone.150 With these thoughts in mind, 
this Comment now turns to see how the Court’s approach holds 
up against the problems found with the current American civil 
religion and its alternatives. 
B. A Solution to the Problems of the Current American Civil Religion 
According to critics, the current American civil religion faces five 
problems.151 This section shows how the Court’s approach addresses 
each of these problems. 
The first problem with the old American civil religion is that 
there is no consistent approach to the government’s allowance of 
religious symbols and expressions.152 The Court’s approach solves 
this; the government can use and allow religious expressions and 
symbols in its activities as long as 1) its purpose is not to promote 
religion and 2) it does not preclude any religion from expressing 
itself when the government allows another to do so.153 This rule can 
consistently and logically address each of the major public religion 
challenges facing the courts. 
Under this approach, Pleasant Grove City could have a Ten 
Commandments monument as long as 1) its purpose is to build the 
city’s identity through a tie to its history or culture,154 and 2) other 
monuments that have a tie to religion are also allowed if they meet 
the same criteria.155 Similarly, the government could allow a Latin 
cross on public lands as long as 1) its purpose is to depict fallen 
soldiers, not promote Christianity156 and 2) other religious symbols 
 
 149. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 285. 
 150. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1822. 
 151. See supra Section I.B. 
 152. See Mirsky, supra note 14. 
 153. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811; Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010); 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
 154. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472. 
 155. See id. at 465 (mentioning the city’s requirements for accepting a monument and, 
thus implying based on the facts, that the Ten Commandments met them because the donors 
had long standing ties to the city while the Summum monument did not because it was an 
out-of-town religion). But, as mentioned before, other minority faiths must be allowed to 
donate if they do meet this same criteria. 
 156. Buono, 559 U.S. at 715–17, 721–22. 
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are allowed for the same purpose.157 Also, legislators could allow any 
minister to begin the meeting with a prayer or other opener as long 
as 1) the purpose of the prayer focuses on helping the legislators 
understand the gravity of their task and rise above their differences, 
not to promote or denigrate a religious belief or unbelief158 and 2) 
any religious leader can offer the ceremonial opening.159 
Additionally, this approach would extend to other areas where 
government and religion mix. The phrase “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance could be found permissible since 1) its purpose 
is to remind citizens that their rights come not from the 
government, but from a source outside of it160 and 2) an individual 
can replace that phrase with an alternative that fulfills this same 
purpose.161 Federal officials can be sworn in using a Bible and the 
phrase “so help me God” as long as 1) its purpose is to help the 
officials fully commit and devote their service to their country and 
not their own personal interests and 2) other religious books and 
phrases (or other deeply meaningful documents such as the U.S. 
Constitution for non-believers) can be used instead.162 This idea still 
conforms with the notion that “the state may not . . . declare any 
particular religious doctrine to be the true one, or enact laws that 
clearly imply such a declaration of religious truth.”163 
The second problem for critics lies in the belief that the 
American civil religion favors Judeo-Christian beliefs over others,164 
 
 157. See, e.g., id. at 745 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Buono v. 
Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cirt. 2004) (explaining, disapprovingly, that the Park Service 
denied “an adherent of the . . . Buddhist faith” from putting up a similar religious memorial to 
fallen WWII soldiers). 
 158. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818–19, 1826–27. 
 159. See, e.g., id. at 1824 (holding that the town must have “a policy of nondiscrimination”). 
 160. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“The phrase ‘under God’ is a recognition of our Founder’s political philosophy that a power 
greater than the government gives the people their inalienable rights. Thus, the Pledge is an 
endorsement of our form of government, not of religion or any particular sect.”). 
 161. For example, those of the Jewish faith can use “under Yahweh,” Muslims “under 
Allah,” and even non-believers could use “under natural rights” or a similar idea. 
 162. See Frederic J. Frommer, Congressman to Be Sworn in Using Quran, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Jan. 3, 2007, 4:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/03/AR2007010301179.html (detailing how a Muslim 
congressman used a Quran to be sworn into the U.S. Congress). 
 163. KOPPELMAN, supra note 63, at 3. 
 164. See Mirsky, supra note 14, at 1240, 1246. Some argue that it really favors 
conservative Christians over all others. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–
97, 300–01. 
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especially by ignoring and alienating non-monotheists.165 The second 
part of the Court’s approach clearly does not allow this. When 
religious individuals or groups are participating in a public event, 
they must be allowed to use their own religious terminology and 
symbols. Thus even a Wiccan priestess must be allowed to give the 
opening legislative prayer.166 Similarly, any religion may seek a 
holiday display as long as other religions are also allowed to do so. 
As to the first part of the Court’s approach, many symbols and 
expressions in our civil religion do seem to favor Christianity, 
monotheism, or religion generally.167 However, it is impossible to 
find a unanimous expression of belief in any sphere. For example, 
some American’s still disagree with the idea that all men were 
created equal.168 Yet this does not mean that the government should 
remain silent on important issues.169 As the Court held in Summum, 
government could not exist “if every citizen were to have a right to 
insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he 
disagreed.”170 In order to perpetuate the political myth of the 
American nation, the government needs to use a civil religion.171 
While there may be many Americans who do not believe in the terms 
or symbols used by the civil religion,172 the government can and must 
use the most common and historical beliefs available to perpetuate its 
community. This approach fulfills this need. 
Third, critics argue that through civil religion the government is 
placing religion at the head of public discussions.173 However, 
government does a similar thing with race every time that it 
celebrates black history month.174 This commemoration exists even 
 
 165. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 276, 301–02, 305; see also Ferrari supra 
note 9, at 757. 
 166. See Town of Greece. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (2014). 
 167. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 26, at 278, 296–97, 300–01. 
 168. See Smith, supra note 9, at 312. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (quoting Keller v. State 
Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1990)). 
 171. See supra Part I.A. 
 172. Compare McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that 97% of Americans are monotheists), with Gedicks & Hendrix, supra 
note 26, at 288 (estimating that only 66–75% of Americans are monotheists). 
 173. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Kevin J. Seamus Hasson, A Modest St. Paddy’s Day Proposal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
16, 2009, 11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123725627239551027. The same 
could also be said of ethnicity with every St. Patrick’s Day parade. See id. 
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though a Constitutional Amendment prohibits this racial 
differentiation.175 Yet, this does not mean that the government 
cannot publicly acknowledge the different aspects of our culture, 
whether race or religion.176 This is seen in Town of Greece, where the 
Court held that legislative prayers “acknowledg[e] the central place 
that religion, and religious institutions, hold in the lives of those 
present.”177 They recognize that “many Americans deem that their 
own existence must be understood by precepts far beyond the 
authority of government to alter or define.”178 Additionally, a prayer 
can “show who and what [the legislators] are without denying the 
right to dissent by those who disagree.”179 Thus the purpose of this 
civil religion is not to promote religion, but to acknowledge its role 
in society as a builder and unifier.180 
This might be labeled as sanctioned pluralism. Not only do many 
Americans deeply care about their beliefs, but they also have a wide 
variety of beliefs. The courts must strive to create a system that 
allows each of those beliefs to coexist with one another. Religious 
scholars have argued that establishing a system that allows this 
coexistence of many beliefs is essential to social stability.181 The 
courts must sanction the right of every belief system to express itself 
publicly in order to show other belief systems that all are welcome 
 
 175. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Hasson, supra note 174. 
 176. See Hasson, supra note 174; see also Vanja-Ivan Savić, Still Fighting God in the Public 
Arena: Does Europe Pursue the Separation of Religion and State Too Devoutly or Is It Saying It 
Does Without Really Meaning It?, 2015 BYU L.REV. 679, 681 (“[W]hen playing solely by 
secularism’s rules, the state ignores that religious guidelines are more than just a part of history 
and tradition; they are actual living pieces of culture and, therefore, part of the state’s public 
and legal existence.”) (citations omitted); Willaime, supra note 147, at 798–99 (“[P]ublic 
authorities [have recognized] the historical and cultural importance that one or several specific 
religious traditions have had in a given country. . . . [In] trying to promote a sense of equality 
by putting all religions on the same level . . . seems like an attempt to apply an abstract scheme 
that denies history and reality. Merely considering the individual aspects of religious and 
philosophical attitudes fails to account for the cultural strata of societies, the fact that particular 
religious dimensions have played a more significant role in the history of the societies and in 
their configuration as state-national communities.”) (citations omitted). 
 177. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1827 (2014); see also Salazar v. 
Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 718–19 (2010) (“The Constitution does not oblige government to 
avoid any public acknowledgment of religion’s role in society.”). 
 178. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827. 
 179. Id. at 1826. 
 180. See Buono, 559 U.S. at 718–19. 
 181. W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & BRETT G. SCHARFFS, LAW AND RELIGION: NATIONAL, 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 13–14 (2010) (citing John Locke, A 
Letter Concerning Toleration (William Popple trans., Huddersfield 1796)). 
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and free to express themselves. The plaintiffs in these cases seem to 
focus on one of two unfortunate alternatives. They either argue that 
the government is asserting Christianity as the main, approved 
religion in the United States by sanctioning only its symbols using 
secular terms,182 or they argue for the prohibition of any government 
use of religion since it establishes that religion.183 Both alternatives 
tell every belief system (religious or not) that they are not welcome 
in the public square unless you are either Christian or non-religious. 
But that is not what made the American experience so unique.184 
Since the early colonial days, there were many different religions and 
over time each colony (and eventually state) had to allow other 
religions to be included.185 With this Court’s approach to civil 
religion, they will officially sanction pluralism. 
Fourth, civil religion contaminates sectarian religion and puts 
pressure on the government to interpret religious symbols as lacking 
in religious significance.186 While there is still a common belief 
expressed through aspects of the civil religion, the Court’s approach 
would make clear that any religion can express itself through 
governmental activities. Now, any person with any belief can perform 
the ceremonial opening of a town board meeting.187 It might be 
argued as well that now any religion can seek a government holiday 
display as long as it fulfills the secular purpose for having the 
displays. Additionally, the Court has directly rejected the idea of a 
watered down, generic civil religion.188 As it affirmed, religious 
leaders should not be asked to “set aside their nuanced and deeply 
personal beliefs for vague and artificial ones.”189 There is no 
establishment problem as long as any religious or non-religious belief 
can be freely and sincerely expressed. And while Summum and Buono 
focus solely on the secular purpose of the religious symbols,190 Town 
 
 182. Brett Scharffs, Creation and Preservation in the Constitution of Civil Religion, 41 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 985, 999 (2010). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See DURHAM & SCHARFFS, supra note 181 at 18. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014). 
 188. See id. at 1820–24. 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
 190. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009); Salazar v. Buono, 559 
U.S. 700, 721 (2010). 
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of Greece allows prayers to be done for a secular purpose but without 
removing the religious significance of the prayer.191 
Thus this slightly departs from Andrew Koppelman’s approach 
which requires “that religion’s goodness be understood at a high 
enough level of abstraction that the state takes no position on any 
live religious dispute.”192 Koppelman’s approach allows abstract 
religion, but does not allow the government to include any religious 
symbols or expressions that further its secular purpose.193 This 
approach will continue this dilution of religion that many Americans 
and Town of Greece194 directly reject. 
Fifth and finally, the critics argue that American civil religion is 
being narrowed by conservative Christians to only represent their 
specific values and beliefs.195 It is true that all of the cases focused on 
here had a tie to Christianity,196 but the second part of the Court’s 
approach ensures that non-Christians are not excluded from these 
opportunities. In the first two cases, it was not the Christian message 
of the monuments that was allowed by the courts, but their historical 
meaning.197 Simply because Christianity is closely tied into important 
historical events does not mean that those events should be banned 
from government recognition.198 However, the government must 
also allow other religious symbols that fulfill that same purpose, an 
issue that was not before the courts in any of these cases.199 In Town 
of Greece, the Court stated that prayer as a ceremonial part of 
 
 191. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1826–27. 
 192. KOPPELMAN, supra note 63, at 2. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1822. 
 195. See supra note 40. 
 196. Summum dealt with the Ten Commandments monument which could be seen as 
Judeo-Christian, but is definitely Christian. See 555 U.S. 460, 464–465 (2009). Buono faced 
the issue of using a Latin cross, a symbol that often represents Christianity. See 559 U.S. 700, 
715, 721 (2010). Town of Greece nearly always had Christian ministers give the ceremonial 
prayer because the town was predominantly of that faith. See 134 S. Ct. at 1816. 
 197. See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472; Buono, 559 U.S. at 716. 
 198. See Buono, 559 U.S. at 718–19. 
 199. In Summum, the Court rejected the minority’s attempt to be included not because 
it was a non-Christian faith, but because inclusion of its monument would destroy the secular 
purpose of the city to celebrate organizations that had an important impact on the community. 
See Summum, 555 U.S. at 472. In Buono, the Court was not determining if the cross violated 
the Establishment Clause, so it did not need to look at the fact that a Buddhist monument was 
not allowed at the site. Compare Buono, 559 U.S. at 706 with id. at 745 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Finally in Town of Greece, no religious leader was ever denied the opportunity to 
pray even if they were not intentionally recruited. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824. 
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government is open to any religion and does not need to be 
exclusively the job of a paid Christian minister as was traditionally 
done.200 As previously mentioned, any and all beliefs can express 
themselves in the legislative opening ceremony, which is certainly not 
an endorsement of Christianity. 
While not perfect at addressing these concerns, the Court’s 
approach in these three cases arguably responds to each criticism and 
does so in a way that can be agreeable to most. And as the Court 
said in Town of Greece, “[o]ur tradition assumes that adult citizens, 
firm in their own beliefs, can tolerate and perhaps appreciate a 
ceremonial prayer delivered by a person of a different faith.”201 
Additionally, this approach also potentially solves the problems 
caused by the aforementioned alternatives.202 
C. A Solution to the Problems Caused by Proposed Alternatives 
Through these three cases, the Roberts Court implicitly rejects 
the alternative versions of the civil religion in favor of principles that 
could lead to a new version of civil religion. 
First, while the Roberts Court’s approach seems similar to 
aspects of Italy’s version,203 it has one key difference that solves a 
major problem found in the latter’s approach: the separation of 
church and state.204 This separation allows all religions the chance to 
participate in the public square and is key to the Court’s approach. 
All religions can perform the ceremonial opening of a legislative 
session, use their revered book or document to be sworn into office, 
and place their holiday displays on government property. People of 
any belief can express themselves as they choose in the public square. 
It also overcomes issues with Mirsky’s method.205 His solution of 
a civil religion devoid of any actual religious elements might lead to 
less support for “social justice and human rights,” hold less sway 
over the nation’s citizens, and publicly treat religion’s role 
historically and culturally as second class to other ideologies and 
beliefs.206 The Court’s approach avoids all three of these 
 
 200. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1824. 
 201. See id. at 1823. 
 202. See supra Part I.B. 
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
 204. See Ferrari supra note 9, at 756. 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. 
 206. See supra Part I.B. 
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consequences. It allows a civil religion that retains the religious 
elements that can better support social justice and human rights.207 It 
will also better unite Americans.208 For example, a federal official is 
sworn into office using a Bible and the phrase “so help me God.” 
While the Constitution and “so help me America” could be used 
instead, for many religious people these alternatives would not 
express as deep of a commitment to faithfully serve their country as 
their own religious book and higher power. The key lies not in 
barring religion from the public square but in allowing any religion 
or non-religion to use whatever best leads to this deep 
commitment.209 Similarly, the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance is meant to convey that rights and liberties come from a 
source outside of the government and thus cannot be taken away by 
the state.210 Using a phrase such as “under natural rights” cannot stir 
the soul of most Americans and thus would fail to effectively remind 
them of where their rights come from. Additionally, the Court’s 
approach will continue to respect religion’s role in history and 
culture without promoting it over other ideologies or beliefs that 
have also played important roles in these spheres. This allows 
religions to publicly celebrate holidays just as other groups are 
allowed to do even though the government is banned from 
discriminating among them (e.g. races with Black History month 
and ethnicities with St. Patrick’s Day).211 
Finally, this approach overcomes the problems caused by both 
Gedicks and Hendrix’s approach212 and the French’s laïcité,213 
including avoiding a secular basis that is actually not neutral toward 
religion and has no way of producing common values without 
looking to religion. While the Court’s approach is not perfectly 
neutral toward specific religions, it still allows a wide range of 
religious practices to be involved in its governmental activities and 
seeks to include as many religions as possible in its necessary 
 
 207. See supra note 63. 
 208. See supra note 64; see also Bellah, supra note 18, at 9–11 (describing the use of civil 
religion during the Civil War to unify the nation). 
 209. See supra note 163 (detailing how a Muslim congressman used a Quran to be sworn 
into the U.S. Congress). 
 210. See Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1037 (2010). 
 211. See Hasson, supra note 174. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 52–55. 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 56–61. 
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declaration of a common American belief. It also allows the 
government to look to religious values to determine its own, even if 
it cannot base its decision on a religious argument. Thus, even 
though it is still imperfect in its approach, the Roberts Court’s 
approach best balances the need for a common belief to unify the 
nation with the policy of nondiscrimination among religions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In summary, every government needs some type of belief system 
to help create a community or nation amongst its citizens. While 
there are several systems to fill this need, a public religion best 
balances the need for a deep tie to the community with the ability of 
citizens to still identify with the nation despite differences in 
religious belief. Neither a state church nor thin procedural values can 
achieve this balance. However, there have been serious and 
legitimate concerns raised about public religion, especially as seen in 
the United States. 
The Roberts Court has addressed these concerns in three of its 
cases. First, the Court allowed government use of religious 
expressions as long as they had a secular purpose. Second, it did not 
deny any religion or belief system the opportunity to participate or 
be used in these public expressions as long as they fulfill the same 
secular purpose. This two-pronged approach will help develop a new 
American public religion that fosters greater inclusion of all beliefs 
while still maintaining an overall American identity based on a 
commitment to understanding and transcendence of differences. 
This approach will also overcome many of the criticisms laid against 
the current public religion by creating a consistent approach, 
treating all religions equally in public expression, allowing all 
religions to be an important part of public discussions, retaining the 
relevance and purity of each religion, and broadening instead of 
narrowing the scope of inclusion. Finally, it ensures that the 
government continues to officially sanction pluralism and public 
religious expressions. 
The Roberts Court will most likely continue to face more cases 
involving the government’s public use of religion. The Court must 
continue to realize the importance of promoting religious diversity 
through its public religion by following the principles laid out in 
these three cases and by developing a more defined test. Otherwise 
it will continually be striving to find new ways to justify the 
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inclusion of religious symbols and expressions under secular terms 
while not allowing other religious symbols and expressions to be 
used as well or it will decide to exclude religion entirely from 
governmental expression. This continued schizophrenic approach 
will only lead to more confusion. This will be especially important 
for lower courts, which may understandably misinterpret the 
Supreme Court’s precedent and fall into the traps of complete 
exclusion of all religions from public use or exclusion of all 
religions except Judeo-Christianity. 
Instead, religion in general should continue to be treated equally 
with other non-religious philosophies and ideologies. The 
government should only allow it to be used when it furthers a 
purpose that is non-religious, such as uniting Americans as a political 
community. Meanwhile, the debate will continue among scholars as 
to whether this approach really succeeds or if it can be replaced by 
something better suited to Americans’ needs. 
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